be to be in the business, it's not a tricky question for you. would it be before november 2014? >> i do not know.

>> you have not thought through it? >> needs to be proposed and final -- i have not even been briefed on that because we are still looking at the science in the right to keep the policy and legal questions aside. >> very quickly, you did a national survey of the willingness of people to pay? >> i believe it was. >> did you also survey the industry to see if they were willing to pay for the epa opinion on whether or not it was cost cost-effective, and did you also do a survey to see if people were willing to pay for the loss of jobs and jobs were exported offshore because our plants cannot compete? >> i think that we are seeing a little bit of apples and oranges. i'm not sure it's time for me to clarify what the survey was doing and what role it was applying. >> we will talk off-line.

>> thank you, sir. the gentleman from newtown, mr. stewart is recognized. >> thank you, madam administrator, thank you for being here today. i'm sure that you just enjoyed your warning. >> i'm honored to be your. >> thank you. i must say that you have worked hard to serve your country. but there there are so many things that you and i disagree with. and that i believe that the epa is working not for but actually against the best interest of the american people. some of them have been brought up to date and is hearing so far. and the interpretation of the navajo waters and the clean air act. we have those standards that were mentioned and it's going to affect huge part of the west.

the standards for the carbon emissions and standards that we have spent some time slip talking about coal-fired power plants. all these are taken together, i believe with these new rules and proposals are harder for new working families and they take away economic freedom and opportunity, i believe. and they have the effect of making washington dc more and more powerful and more and more centric to the american people's lives. frankly, the american people are less trussell of washington dc due to this and i'm sure that you have a sense of that as well and very clearly, some of the questions and concerns indicate that to you as well. but let me focus on one of them, if i could. it will affect the democratic and republican histories and the states. and i will start with a simple

question, and that is not intended to be a budget question at all, do you think it would be appropriate for the epa to propose a standard that would be impossible to meet? >> if it is a health-based standards about what is healthy and impacts associated with it, we need to rely on the science to say that. >> would you propose a standard that would be impossible to meet? would that be appropriate for the epa to do? >> it really depends upon the question. if it's a health-based standards, you said is based on the health impacts. >> once again, it is impossible to meet comment it doesn't matter what it might be. and i think that everyone would recognize that. >> we would not require the impossible, sir. >> i appreciate that and it wouldn't be appropriate for the epa to set standards that are actually below naturally

occurring levels and if i could call your attention and i suppose you have seen something like this before regarding the ozone standards. the areas in red reflect these counties. it indicates those that anticipate the 60 parts per billion and if you see that, i represent parts of utah and it got some of the most remote, they are very beautiful, but some of the most unpopulated areas of our nation. you could include yellowstone national park in this map as well. and yet using it as an example, 66 parts per billion, which is above what some of the proposed standards are and are being considered. and i guess i would just ask if you are aware that some of the

most remote and pristine parks of the country have an ozone that exceeds the range of this proposed standard? >> there is no proposed standard at this point. let's just make sure that people are not confused by that. but i would also say that i know the science advisory board is looking at this issue with the staff so they can establish some recommendations to me, moving forward and take a look at these issues. >> okay. maybe there isn't a proposed standard and it depends on what the meaning of the word is is and we could go back to technical definitions. but there is certainly definitions of a standard of 60 parts per billion. >> i do not know whether that is part of the consideration that the science advisory board will advise her advising on.

>> this spring we were told that that was a standard that they were considering and that they were not only considering it, but it was one that they were leaning towards. and we expected it to be the new proposed standard. i guess i would just conclude with this since my time is waning. and i wish i had more time. but there is nothing that these western states can do to achieve that kind of standard and it will have a great economic costs by the epa's own estimate. $90 billion, by summit could be 10 times that amount. i would like to talk another time about just the wisdom and the sanity of the epa proposing this standard that is impossible to meet that would be incredibly expensive. and once again, coming back to my opening statement, and why that generates so much suspicion and so much ill will in the

american people. with that, i thank you, and ms. chairman, and i yield back my time. >> thank you. the gentleman from oklahoma is recognized for his questioning. >> okay, he is not here and so we are going to the gentleman from texas. >> hello, ms. mccarthy, i'm over here. i know that we are kind of jumping around and i think that earlier you gave me my favorite tweet of the day. which is i am lucky enough -- [inaudible] >> the quote that i'm lucky enough not to have to sign-up for obamacare. and that is wonderful. i wish my constituents could stay the same. >> i think i was referring to i'm lucky enough to have good health to you.

>> doucet also hear testimony they are $2 billion in new jobs from the epa i would like to point out that one facility alone in my district is a 7 billion-dollar of new construction representing 13,000 jobs in your administration and they are saying because of a two-week furlough it will take many more weeks to look at this. and i would request that given the circumstances of our poor economy and the fact that this needs to be done, it is meeting all the epa requirements and i would ask that you, and i will follow-up with you, that you look at this and expedite expediter. the 12,000 jobs is a lot of jobs. >> i'm sorry, what kind of permit? >> the epa permit. it's been sitting there in your office. >> i'm happy to follow up. >> there is also another plant that wants to export corso will be buried here in my district and altogether we have $52 billion that is being held up by the epa, which by the way

is more than sequester. i'm just saying that there are a lot of jobs that are dependent and i would like to give that information to you so we can facilitate the jobs that i know this president wants and i really want to help him out in doing that. texas represents 50% of all adults in the united states and in my district, we have 30,000 people moving to our district and there has been over a million wells frats and a lot of bracketing and there is a general history in the united states of people independently drilling for oil and producing products that this nation relies upon and we are going to produce more than saudi arabia. i think it's because the independence and the driver of the american spirit are part of this. so that we can see a future where we have independence from the middle east and it has great implications under foreign

policy and people's future. and i'm really frustrated when i come back to my district and i have people coming to my meetings in saying that we want the jobs and i have to tell them that i'm sorry, that someone from the epa is not letting us have the jobs and i'm just begging you, please open your heart up, get these permits done, they've done the work and they've complied with all the regulations and i don't see, for two weeks they say that we shut down the government and it shouldn't take months to recuperate the two weeks that is lost and i don't know, i even had a plant that's not in my district, now a lot of them are close in the united states and they are spending $100 million upgrading this and so now the chinese are going to produce it. now we won't have enough for it those that are coming from china, i mean, really frustrated that we have so much opportunity in this country and again and again and again, it comes back to your administration want to hear about, okay, it's locked up

here and there and everywhere and i go to town hall meetings and i would love for you to come with me and i will invite you to a meeting where we can share the podium and hear from the people individually who are losing their jobs because we can't get the permits and i am troubled that again, time and again, i just can't get any satisfaction except for the rolling stones, of course, from your administration. >> that's just the temptation to think. >> go for it. but we can work together, i will still appreciate it. >> this is an issue that frankly i just have not heard for a long time. i think we have been trying to do our best to expedite this as much as we possibly can, knowing the economic implications of that. so if you do have concerns, we need to tackle them together. >> one thing that i would like to add for my colleagues. he wanted to clarify that in the

report, in places for the record that if i could please insert the. >> go ahead. >> thank you. >> the gentleman from kentucky is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. throughout this hearing, you have touted the importance of transparency. and i agree. we have, said in your agency announced it would hold public sessions on reducing carbon emissions from the existing power plants to consider the public concerns ahead of the development of the epa. i was disappointed to learn that all of the epa sessions are in major metropolitan areas and none of these would be in the 10 states most reliant upon coal fire power. in november you were sent a letter saying that kentuckians party lost more than 6200 coal employment, reducing it since the commonwealth began keeping

the statistics in 1927 and unfortunately these jobs and job losses are forecasted to continue and increase as the regulations come online and in this letter, we request that you hold these listening sessions and kentucky for the sake of openness and transparency that you have espoused today in the eyes of kentuckians and the american people, recommitting this listening session in the commonwealth and other similar states like north dakota where my colleague is from. those that are reliant on the coal production and electricity, as you will see. >> we have received a number of requests for additional listening sessions. and i would like to explain that those 11 sides are actually our regional offices. because it is part of that. >> we appreciate that and we appreciate that you have held these sessions outside of the offices and i'm glad that you do get outside of the office and

see the people that you affect every worthwhile and certainly you must realize that if you fail to hold these listening sessions on greenhouse gas regulations in the states whose economies depend on the coal industry and electricity, this will be perceived as an effort to avoid negative public opinion and he realized that it will be perceived that way. >> i think people should realize this is before we are proposing this and there is also opportunities for individuals. >> okay, i can let you take all of my time if you're going to answer the question. most other air pollution is a function of this, and many of these states have been recognized as having air-quality urban issues for the most part. so residents of rural areas,

like myself, who rely on what he does and affordable and renewable carbon neutral source of heat energy, they are perpetually perplexed by the epa's fascination with regulating this form of heat since it is primarily the rural form of heat. we believe that the one-size-fits-all comes from washington dc from bureaucrats that have never experienced this or maybe even the exercise of collecting it themselves, that they really aren't qualified to regulate our source of energy, especially when you're you are taking where other sources of energy as well. let me read from the old from the website on the new rules that are being proposed or pre-proposal, certainly from the website. the epa is revising the performance standards for new

residential wood heaters and this action is expected to include the following appliances , wood heaters, stoves, hydraulic heaters in and the list goes on and then it finishes with these standards would apply only to new residential wood heaters and not to existing residential wood heating appliances. is that your impression that these rules would apply this way? >> that is all they do apply to. >> you can promise us today that if americans like the wood stove that they have that they can keep it? >> this particular part of this act does not address existing for these types of pollutants. >> i have one more question but i'm glad that you can assure us that we can keep that if we like it. and i hope that the promise that we can all keep. one more thing that affects rural america. i hope it is a urban legend.

is anyone looking at regulating cow flatulence? >> okay,. >> not that i've heard of. >> part in the? >> the methane emissions from cows, can you assure us that you are not looking at that ennobling epa is? >> no, not that i'm aware of. >> thank you, mr. massey. the gentleman from wyoming is recognized. >> welcome, administrator. in the agency's recently repurposing new source performance standards for power plants, you set levels for coal-fired plants based on the use of carbon capturing technologies and you did not require that same technology for gas fired power plants. by requiring this for the coal units only, are we applying a

standard that is higher regarding the carbon that is emitted from the coal generated power? it just sounds like this is not an all of the above energy plan. it seems to single out coal for punitive treatment. can this really be defended as a transparent and equitable application of the clean air act? like the administration that you testify for, they support opportunities in natural gas and soda water, and i support them also for the new coal fire plants. cold and liquids. all the reasons that the epa has for declining to define these technologies to be the best system for gas-fired units and apply with equal force and so why require it and it strikes me that the answer to that question is to set a precedent.

the epa is under a consent to create and issue new source performance standards for refineries in the near future and will that rule the best system of these technologies that is unproven on a commercial scale? that seems to be the new definition of adequately demonstrated. when the epa requires a technology for new coal plants that is not yet in commercial operation, what is to stop it from doing the same for other sources of carbon? earlier in response to the gentleman, you said that the cts technology is ready according to the doe. in front of this committee and the summer, they couldn't give us a date for the technology to be ready and then the former secretary of energy was here two weeks ago and he testified as well that commercial technology

currently is not available to meet the epa proposed rule. so our problem is that this committee is receiving conflicting testimony from the former secretary of doe at your sister agency. and i find it interesting that the epa claims that regardless of this new rule, no one plans to build traditional coal plants. so does this rule achieve any of the epa carbon reduction goals? by its own admission, the requirement of the carbon reducing technology for plants that were will never be built, but at the same time it is requiring no reductions from natural gas plants, even though they are being built in greater numbers than ever before. this does not make sense to me. and i would just like to ask if it makes sense to you.

>> could address the issues that you have raised? >> just. >> okay, in terms of why we wouldn't be proposing the ccs on natural gas, we do not have that kind of wealth of data that we have for the demonstration of it on natural gas as we do on coal and we know that they run differently and that the technology is different and we know that the gas stream for natural gas is different and we did not have the data available to be able to propose the ccs on the natural gas and we went with what we knew to be demonstrated with the technology moving forward and we do have data on the coal fire power side that addresses these for being robust. but we will look at the comments that come in. relative to the doe, they have been in this vast and very supportive of the way that we are looking at the data in the

industry sector moving forward. >> squeezing in one more question before i run out of time. >> okay, sorry. >> let me ask you, and this is kind of a yes or no question. is it the epa's view that section 111 of the clean air act gives state primacy in the implementation of new source performance standards for existing power plants? >> yes, it is the state implementation that needs to be developed. >> okay. >> the one i wanted to hear was this idea that we are not going to be making any progress moving forward because most of them are natural gas. while we are trying to do is make sure that new facilities like power plants that are around for 60 or 70 years, that they take advantage of the technologies available to them today, so that they can be part of this next moving forward and coal is important now and it

also will be in the future. >> the gentleman from north carolina. please go ahead. >> thank you. >> i'm sorry, from north dakota? >> yes. >> okay. >> thank you i misspoke the first of anything other than north dakota's. >> thank you for being here today. but i would love to ask him questions about the hydraulic fracturing. but before i do that, i would like to follow up on the invitation by mr. massey for you to go to kentucky and hold a listening session on your way to north dakota on the new standard for we would like to submit and i'd love to talk to you about october 18 of the record, mr. chairman. >> okay. >> it just seems like in the spirit of transparency, that

having these 11 listening sessions in the cities where you have regional offices, that it's okay as far as it goes. but what a wonderful opportunity it would be to add some more listening sessions. so i would really love to have you commit to these other places. >> i appreciate that. i just want to tell you that that is not the extent of what we're doing and those are the major listening sessions, but the regional offices in our administrations are branching out to the individual states as well. >> i understand that. i understand it in that in a place like north dakota where there are jobs at stake, there are a lot of really wonderful and smart experts and scientists who work in this every day to provide lots of good information and a better method might be to hold a listening session in public view for everyone to participate in i would appreciate it and i would love it if we could work out the details at another time with

what time in cities and cities and all that. but i also want to talk about the hydraulic fracturing study that you are engaged in. because i have concerns about it, especially the study design and some of the goals of that study. because as we have discussed previously with other witnesses, this idea searching for what is possible is problematic from, what i think is a real scientific standpoint. one of the primary goals is to answer questions like what are the possible impacts of the hydraulic fracturing and service bills on drinking water resources. and it appears that if the epa advisory of science board shares this concern as well. and one would be no quantitative risk assessment, including the research effort, does the reader

has no sense of how risky and the operation may actually be an impact in drinking water and this is also a significant limitation of the work. there isn't a possibility sufficient to this regulatory action in her mind? >> i actually think that this is purely a scientific research project so that we are able to understand the potential implications. it is not a regulatory decision. >> yes, but again, the possible versus probable. i mean, what is the standard and probability before we continue with more leaders and resources, given the fact that hydraulic fracturing is not a new technology. >> yes, yes. >> so is there a line and you can understand why the industry and the states that have this could be concerned that we go down this path with the possibility of a standard and the uncertainty that that creates as we become more energy

securing this country. >> my understanding is that this is a number of research projects that we are looking out for the potential for impact on the water supplies and it is the first step in looking at this and a comprehensive ways we can be sure that we are doing things safely. >> i agree that this is one been part of something more comprehensive. because the director in may of last year stated that the agency is doing a pretty comprehensive look at all the statutes to determine what holes may allow for additional federal oversight. so is this part of the comprehensive look for the holes and opportunities to regulate through? >> my understanding is that, and we can certainly follow up on us. but this is purely a research project and it is not, at this point, it is not talking about what laws we might utilize or what regulations we might want

to do. >> can be found in the holes would you know of any regulatory holes that might propose further regulation. >> we also need to look at hydraulic fracturing on water quality. >> the gentleman from florida, you are recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, madam and minister for your testimony today. i really appreciate your direct responses. >> thank you. >> following up on the questions that we had earlier today, concerning science-based management.

how many ice ages have become part of her do you know? >> i'm sorry, sir either not now. >> okay, some say three and others say five. do you think we've had ice ages before? >> i'm quite sure of reading about those but i am not a scientist and i don't want to pretend to be for you, we can get our scientist to respond. >> i would really like that. and normally, we can't have ice ages without a warning. matt between them. and i was just wondering if you happened to know what the temperature was here on earth between the last two ice ages. >> i'm sorry, sir, i cannot answer those questions. >> if i told you the earth was 30 degrees warmer before the last ice age, without surprise you? >> they would not influence my

decision in terms of listening to the science and consensus around climate. i leave the science to the scientists. >> don't you think the history of the earth should have a bearing on science? >> i'm positive that it does. >> i just don't want to pretend that i am a scientist and have that discussion because i am not. i do listen to the scientists and i listen to the consensus that is being drawn. >> i listen to them as well. and i don't claim to be a scientist. but i don't put my head in the sand and ignore science. >> absolutely. >> berm wondering what impact you thought carbon emissions have on previous global warming between ice ages. >> the intimation that i have available to me relates to all of the work that is done by the number of scientists scientist looking at the climate issues

and climate changes, and i'd pay attention to that and i apply the science and decisions moving forward. i am not either comfortable were qualified to have a science discussion with you on these issues. >> do you see the promulgation of any rules that would enact of the carbon tax in the future? >> say that again, sir? >> dc the promulgation of any rules that would enact a carbon tax for this country in the future? >> only if congress provides that mechanism then no. >> okay. >> mr. chairman, i can't get my questions answered, so i'm pretty much finished. >> i don't believe we have any other members with questions. so ma'am, thank you for your presence today and we may have additional questions and we hope that you will reply to those.

>> may ask one favor? >> of course. >> i know you asked me a lot of information about the subpoena issues and i want to make sure that we both understood one another. so if we could meet afterwards, i want to make sure that i gave perfectly correct answers and that our expectations are the same on what you are looking for and whether or not we have complied with that and what you're looking for next. i want to be very respectful of you and the wishes of those department. >> i am encouraged by your answers and i hope you will give us the data that we would like to have independently verified. did you once tell us that if you like it you can have it? [laughter] >> thank you today. we stand adjourned. >> up next on c-span2, a look at china's use of cyberattacks and espionage and then a conversation on the defense

facing the u.s. military. and the role of the federal government and the different perspectives involved. >> prime minister david cameron plans to use internet filters to block users in the uk to block those from certain types of content. we will have live coverage tomorrow. and consumer spending for this holiday shopping season, that is 10:00 a.m. eastern from the consumer federation of america and the credit union national association. >> the 60s were different. [laughter] and there were a lot of things

happening about the structure of society and i was suddenly out of the seminary and in new england. and there were no rules, things were falling apart. and you know, without structure, it's very difficult to navigate. i was extremely fortunate to be a part of this. i was in fortunate to have a residuum of the way that i was raised by the structure that the nuns had given me and the seminary had given me and i was also extremely fortunate because i have already done in predominantly white schools and i was the only black kid in high school. so the transition to the school with very few blacks have been part of a specific set of circumstances and i had sort of a jump start. i was ahead of the game and so i

had something. it allowed me to continue to do well, even though it was very difficult. >> thanksgiving on c-span. hear from two supreme court justices. clarence thomas at 9:00 p.m. followed by elena kagan. also this holiday weekend, 40 is a booktv on two, including deborah solomon on allies in the art of norman rockwell at 9:30 p.m. a non-american history tv, the 150th anniversary of the gettysburg address. the 10 sentences that president lincoln spoke at soldiers national cemetery at 4:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. national security adviser susan rice warned last week that china's cyberespionage against the united states is undermining economic relationships between the two countries. next, we have a look at the role of the cyberespionage in u.s. and china relations and we will hear from "new york times"

correspondent david sanger. it was hosted by the asia society in the month of september. [applause] >> thank you. thank you so much, tom for the wonderful introduction. [applause] we are privileged to be here with you today. [inaudible] [inaudible] >> we are having this conversation for 40 or 45 minutes, something like that, and then we will leave it up to all of you and all who are watching this on the internet and have a way of sending in their questions to the

moderator. those are supposed to magically appear on the ipad. if they do not, the questions have all been eliminated out there right off the bat. so i was on a panel recently with the head of the nsa chief alexander and before we sat down he said that i really don't like questioning this. [laughter] >> so let's start with tom rid. mr. thomas rid, you have come to a definition of what cyberwar is and is not. and i think that we all agree on this panel that we have seen gradation of cyberactivity and intellectual property and

corporate secrets, state secrets, espionage that is cyberenabled and we see occasional cyberattacks on infrastructure, which is what happened in operation of the games and against iran's nuclear program. we see denial of service attacks in an effort to bring down banking systems or freezing of the entire "new york times" website, as was managed to do over the summer months. so for a good number of hours. and then, there is the overall cyberwar, which you described in these terms, and for those that i hear that did not have to suffer through this, which is

near a thousand pages long. so it's very good in new york for killing rats, but you use a very classic definition of cyberwar. so which of these will not occur? espionage is happening, some infrastructure attacks are happening. clearly denial of service attacks are happening. and what is it that you are saying what happened. >> first of all, i would like to specify that i'm actually not talking about the future in the spirit of the book is the opposite, looking at the records and the technical possibilities. and then i think we need to put this cyberwar debate into context. many people use this and we are talking about the war on drugs

and cancer and poverty and we are talking about the real thing at the same time. so i'm trying to do is to help distinguish, which can still be very serious, and the real thing. executed with the help of a computer code and i need to meet three criteria. one is a could be violent or potentially violent. and it needs to be instrumental in terms of somebody trying to change someone else strategically, and it needs to be political in the sense that somebody takes credit and if you run those three criteria for all this cyberattacks that you have seen, they don't usually meet those criteria. so first of all, what is it? you mentioned this already,

grouping those injured three different sections. cybertalks, withdrawing a system from a system and only external computer attacks on the industrial control system and other attacks with critical infrastructure insiders and we are talking about very small numbers, as you mentioned. and the second is espionage or in children's operations and commercial or political in nature and third we are talking about subversion activism, which in a separate problem is part of cybercrimes. i think each of those requires a separate discussion with sometimes an intensive duration.

so i'm with you on all that except the part where you say that you're not trying to be predictive. because the title of the book is "cyberwar will not take place". which sounds a little bit like the future. [laughter] >> go right ahead. >> theoretically in french it's about the trojan war and used in that example to encounter this. >> okay. so chad, let me take this to you. you have heard tom rid, the doctor's discussion of this. >> just. >> but you don't get paid by your clients to worry about the past, you get paid to help them for the future. so if you sent them all copies

of the book by doctor tom rid, they would stop paying you. [laughter] >> so you are concerned in the range of crime and subversion in espionage and sabotage and can you tell us at the far end of this, whether you see these types of attacks on infrastructure to be a one up for a were a wave of the future, and whether you think that it could fit with the definition of war, violent or potentially violent political war. >> thank you. i would like to thank the asia society for having me and colombia here in new york and i went to the college and i live just down the street and got my international relations degree and i appreciate the work that the asia society does.

and i think that it's great that we are having this discussion coming on the heels of tom donovan's important address regarding our relationship, not only with asia but with china and the topics of cyber. i respect tremendously tom's intellectual work and i have a lot of appreciation for the in depth analysis that he has been given an i would respectfully disagree, however, that the fundamental definition, that it's intended to change behavior. by that definition, for example, if you think about the cia, when we used to do code in a number of things that we had to do to protect the united states that did not rise to the level of

overt violence, nor did it -- we didn't claim credit for it than there were a lot of things that happen behind the scenes that would have constituted this in the art of war. and if you go to this as david alluded to earlier, war is politics by another means. so i would have a slight definitional difference. but the second thing that i've asked to think about by the many terrorist attacks are taking place in some of them are claimed and some of them are not and we just saw today what may be viewed as a violent terrorist event, we don't know what the multiple individuals involved and tom izzo got ahead of that investigation. that certainly in the boston bombing initially, it was not

the initial claim of responsibility, but clearly a terrorist attack and in my view, we can define this as war is politics by another means and then certainly terrorist attacks are the poor man's way of conflicting with their desired outcome on another power. and if we go to the issue that david has pointed out, i would tell you that that is an exact example, if you define violence or credit and it would not have qualified as an act of war, because nobody had claimed credit for that. and depending on how you define this, you can define it as killing people or worse in that respect, and violence can simply

mean destruction of property or systems as well according to this definition. on the question of whether or not this would become a tool of the future, at the beginning tom said that this is where cyberwar is coming, that was very much a quote like paul revere. my position will be not only is it wrong, but it's happening every day around the world and we will go through many more examples tonight to discuss it. and i think that cyberwar is happening or cyberconflict is

happening. then we can talk about this, so much of it is directed at china and i want to be very clear of this. and this is the single most important act of the nation and the national will to serve and what happened with this attack, it essentially happened, what happened was the society was attacked and the iranians believed that they were collaborating with other powers to stop their nuclear program, which david wrote about at that time. and essentially extracted the retribution or the physical disruption of over 30,000 computers, which now it literally destroys the system and blinded the values of the millions of records that are all reserved and it would be the

equivalent of just your core source of national strength and it was an act of war and it was done by the iranians and i think it's a great example of this. >> before i go on, let me just please circle back to doctor tom rid and say, okay. and to examples that we subscribe to, in the olympic games and the centrifuges are made to blow up, you have probably seen the photographs of these giant floor-to-ceiling devices with supersonic speeds. when they blow up, it's like setting a bomb off and you don't want to be standing next to him and to this day, we don't know if anyone was killed or not. and then you heard about chad

describing the attack on saudi arabia. neither one of those bigger definition. and i think we need to be more honest about this and we have real problems with this. and what i'm saying is that we need a concept and real solutions for the problems and when we are talking war all the time and violence all the time, we are getting close to what needs to be done. and we want to discuss the possibility of the specific acts and we need to get a little bit more technical about it. >> yes, we can come back to that. >> okay, so you are in the foreign service and about seven years. okay. and we are not, tonight, we are not going to ask you to explain

chinese foreign policy. >> that's certainly what it's like in america. [laughter] to all the better reason. okay. but we are going to ask you to explain why it is that the u.s. government gets so worried about technology built by companies not just huawei technologies. and your concern is the following that if you bring a piece of equipment and they basically make the skeletons backbone of the internet in a way, and you bring an it in from a country from which you believe is searching at least on the espionage level of intellectual property theft, we won't go yet to the other definitions.

then you are inviting into the united states hardware that a foreign country can exploit whether they are with the permissions or not. so they can use that to help infiltrate the data that they want or understand the structure of networks in the country, and that is why we have such a trouble in recent times in the u.s. market and you had one of your executives say that they were not that interested in the u.s. market with these restrictions. so the first question is the hardware a back door and for a government like china? and secondly, whether it is or isn't, how do you change the perception of the u.s. government then on that issue?

>> that's a great deal of questions and not opening. and so to answer this. because we are a leader in this industry, why make a 35 billion-dollar country. we have 150 different markets and we count customers with over 500 operations in the world, including nationwide operators in every country that they want. and we are a leader in this technology. >> at the can't deny that. and we do have this, not with any of the major nationwide operators. that we are a resource in terms of understanding the challenges that we face in today's cyberage and we also incidentally have challenges that are raised by

globalization and interdependence and the trans- nationality of the industry. there are benefits to the globalization as well, companies like this that bring to the market to which they do business with affordable broadband. and he made an interesting point on the concern about hardware coming from a certain market. and whether you are huawei -- hi technologies or ericsson or cisco, is a global company you are conducting research on development and coded software and building product than relying on common supply chains on a global basis, all but china, and you are all subject to common and global vulnerabilities and what the

industry is challenged with now and what huawei technologies is globally promoting is how do we acknowledge that there are benefits that we want to continue driving for the economic benefits and the drastic challenges of globalization in our industry, which are threats to the supply chain of information technology companies, all of us. and unless we raise the bar for everyone with appropriate standards and disciplines that are certifiable, you accomplish nothing in terms of better securing networks and the integrity of data. so let me take you back to why the u.s. government has such a concern about huawei. huawei has been blocked in the

u.s., as you yourself have said, american communications companies will put the equipment in, even though you have other countries that work. and they are doing that because they have a specific concern that the chinese government is acting nods -- not with the global market in mind, but with their own narrow interest in mind. are you telling us that that is a completely false way to think about what huawei does and what is the relationship to the government? >> absolutely. a great deal of the challenge that huawei faces in the united states is all geopolitical and that as well and beyond this company. again, we are 150,000 people strong and we are remarkably

diverse now. 70% of our business is outside of china. and we are a multinational company and we are not china. the suggestion that we can better secure their networks or the integrity of data by picking one player or any one player or major vendor out of this equation is wrong. and actually it is distracting to hold up the other players that are equally vulnerable to compromise. and so until a few months ago, we would have said that they were the perfect example of a company that the u.s. government will not purchase from because of geopolitics outweighs the global market description. the geopolitical description. and in the aftermath of this investigation, you could argue

that google and horizon and at&t and anybody who has received a warrant from the pfizer court and turned over the data, can essentially be charged with exactly what the u.s. government is charging huawei has done and what they would say, this is the mirror into which the government of the u.s. has been looking and projecting or assuming and they have never been asked by any government anywhere to compromise its goods or services or others to facilitate in this activities and hasn't happened and what didn't. and it would be -- we had a witness testify in congress last year and the expression he used was it would be commercial suicide to do so. and as you pointed out, in the

wake of the edwards noted revelations, what we read now on a daily basis that these companies that work on trent were compromised unwillingly in many cases, that they are experiencing a rather devastating impact on their current business. and it's a rather remarkable demonstration of why you shouldn't do this. it does reflect the potential for corporate suicide and exactly the thing that huawei would not let happen to itself. you can even say that the edwards noted in revelations, in light of this being a potentially devastating impact on companies that have been exposed as being compromised, but the revelations may have marked the beginning of the end

of knowing corporate complicity, whether willingly or not in government espionage and there is an opportunity now at this time, for industry to move forward and establish pragmatic and true standards to better secure the networks and to undo this crisis of confidence in the industry globally. >> okay, so you were the chief of staff at the department of homeland security during the period of time when we now know, that the definitions of what the u.s. government wanted to get out of the internet providers took place, all the companies that we were talking about here. and when the court was issuing these orders, basically to turn over the data, including as we

now know, the telephone laws, not the conversations, but the laws of the phone calls made, the haystack in which you could pull the needles. please tell us how that clamping in to this giant data pipeline differs, if at all, from what the u.s. government tries to do with like what it huawei does and nothing has been classified. >> you can still keep going. >> okay. [laughter] >> with respect, it is a fair question. ..

to read the constitution in article iv, the government does have a ability to search, but when we say in our country they can't have a right to an unreasonable search without probably cause. what that means is in order to have a search you have to have something to search. and the accumulation of the data of the haste act, the meta data

itself is an example why the government isn't sitting in the system today. it has to ask for the voluntary agreement of the companies to hand over -- they're getting a subpoena. this is voluntary if you go to jail. >> i say it's a fair point. >> well, when i say what, i mean, the government cannot forcibly -- is not technically inside the hardware, which is the concern with the chinese are inside the hardware. which is different from -- you asked me to distinguish between the meta data program and what the rather concerns are -- >> what your telling us, chad, is that the u.s. government isn't in the hardware because it doesn't need to be because it issues these orders to turn over the material that runs through the hardware. >> correct. that's what i'm saying. >> great. supposing with chinese government went to central --

>> use shake shanghai bell as an example. >> that would be great. [laughter] supposing they went to waw lay and say you have a lot of data flowing through your servers. some of outside china. we can't touch those. we would like you to put this in a repository in shank -- shanghai if we need to go in and see what ibm or boeing is planning for their next defense system they're building we have a way of getting at it. would you see a distinction between what chad described which is the u.s. government out of the own legal structure pulling in the data and the chinese government seeking the

same kind of thing? >> there are a lot of different levels to that. first off, what chad described and with a you are talking about is a distinct between a company that builds the plumbing and a service provider that run the water company. what has been happening or what we've been reading happening here is rather than drill random holes to cite certain information that lead do you a crash register in malaysia. they dropped a siphon to the reservoir. >> correct. >> and sucked it out. >> for clarification, while you build hardwares there are some countries which there's never

been any substantiate yaitionz of any current or past penetration or comprise of hugh way equipment. the concern we hear is profrequentive. what may happen someday in the future -- i'll resist the temptation to go back and talk about shanghai bill and cicso operations in china. all of which are equally vol emotional comprise as they are here or might be in vietnam or elsewhere. huawei made a conscious decision it's in our best business interest to maintain the integrity of customers,

networks, and their subscribers data, period. we are not going commit commercialed is by violating that integrity. >> if you receive a legal wander you have go the same thing that verizon, at&t. it's an important point there's not a country in the world that doesn't have lawful intercept. meaning they have their own jurisdiction and in our country under president clinton we passed -- a communications assistance to law enforcement act. and we collectively as taxpayers gave a sub sky -- sub sky to the companies to pay for the hardware and software that allows phone taps to take place.

you cannot have unreasonable searches but you have reasonable searches. just like if you watch the sopranos we, do, in fact, tap the phone of suspected mafia dons inside our own country. so we can't be hypocritical. intil right. we can't be hypocritical of the chinese for enforcing their own. i think the key question that is being put on the table the question is in fact certain what are proported to be private enterprises are in fact tools of the foreign government for the purpose of espionage. i'm not here to suggest whether in fact huawei is or is not. they're doing us a favor in one respect. you remember, i remember back when we were worried about the threat from the japanese against the -- when they bought rockefeller

center down the street and everyone thought the world was coming to an end. one of the great things i remember from one of my professors at columbia was, you know, if we didn't have the japanese we should have invented them. they made us better. they made us more competitive. and the wide reaction of the japanese wasn't protectionism, it was learning to be have a more competitive auto industry. learning to be -- >> i think may actually to talk about situations that are hypothetical than the case -- i think it's not very productive. perhaps the a-- let consider china for a moment. we have an interesting case that flips on the questions that you are questioning. that is microsoft in china. we know that microsoft is cooperating with the chinese government. they have provided various forms of help to the chinese security establishment in order to, for

instance, listen and to skype conversations. it's well known that the chinese government is good at intercepting special key words on social media. it was american products. the government that is able to get help from an american company highly different context. the only pressure point is not the legal. not a legal one. purely commercial. it raises fundamental ethical questions that i'm sure. ethical questions that are the flip side of what you are mentioning. if it has real consequences potentially for the individual. these are concrete questions that really can mean interrogated. people have suffered a personal consequences. this is not very theoretical. we're screaming here.

it's an example of what i mean. and we have a hypothetical discussion about how somebody could use. >> pursue with you. because -- didn't have to deal with big data. okay. so if he was alive today, and he came back and he looked at modern warfare, i suspect having suffered through the thousand pages he would be fascinated by the concept of information war. which is to say you have conflict between states that is an extension of politics by other means without blowing things up. without sending 100,000 troops in. and you can do it by manipulate as one of the categories you had. or that you could begin to

affect infrastructure. you wanted a concrete case. a fascinating chinese-based concrete case is the canadian offshoot a company that controls all of the -- not all of. about 60% of the gas pipeline that works in the united states and down from mexico. so they come in to work one day about a year ago, and they discovered that all of their source code has been taken. they conclude that the taken by a chinese origin thief government or nongovernmental. one way to look at it is that all that was stolen was the software to know how to turn on and off the valve of the gas pipeline. the other way to look at it if you were in a cron -- conflict with the united states, it night be useful to have the coding to turn off the gas to 60% of the country. where does is fit to the

spectrum? >> so in your -- the word cyber weapons is often used in the context. developing code to inexat at a time critical infrastructure. you also use the ebbs presentation in your book. let quickly think about what it means. what are cyber weapons. what the potential of such weaponized code and limitations. let imagine for a moment. the only real big example we have and can discuss in detail. nanl as a --

you would not have noised. because stock net of pro sizely developed for those industrial control systems that messaged. a company. and these are highly specific systems. for many reason. they offer old so called legacy systems. some gear in rick components. it only affected machines incon qecial. it was one shot. that means and one of the arguments that i'm testing in the book and i interviewed many control engineers on that question is by maximizing the destructive impact of such a tactical you automatically -- minimizing the target. that's a tough question to answer. in other words, can you exchange

the of it by using some of the generic components and applying it. t a controversial question among the engineers. it's unclear. >> it takes us up with of the questions by e-mail which is along these lines. ann in brooklyn, i feel like, you know, i feel like we're doing an advice column here. it if the u wanted to conduct a cyberattack against the shanghai military site where the chinese are allegedly carrying out their cyberattacks. she's -- we wrote about it earlier this year. could we do so? could we do it technically and politically? >> now which is a chinese military unit believed responsible for a number of the attack open u.s. computer systems. but mostly for the theft of

intellectual property, some state secrets, airplane design, thing like that. chad, this is right down your ally from dhs days. could we do it technically and do it politically? >> we're off the record; right? >> right. that's why the cameras are running. go ahead. >> so i guess -- >> i can't say whether the united states government has capability. but one might surmise you can take down nuclear center fiewjs as as mentioned in a specific location in iran, you probably could, in fact, target a specific building in shanghai and specific actors. >> to achieve -- >> and thing this case -- >> the objective point. it's a good question. >> to do what? >> to any --

any military doctrine you have what is called a atry biewtion and retribution. if we think back in the cold war. it was at the heart of mutual destruction. it kept us relatively safe over one of the most threatening periods in global history. the world could have been annihilated overnight with an exchange of soviet union and united states weapons. cyber is in fact, the definition used about the last requirement for a war is claiming responsibility. part of the appeal of this particular weapon is its lack of ability to attribute who did. it atry biewtion in this threat vector is unbelievely

complicated. to actually penetrate the multiple layers. i'm speaking now personally because of, you know, -- david didn't get the story. "the washington post beat him to the scoop. but it happens. we were one of the 140 plus companies there were jut lined in kevin's report under what is called -- we were we successfully detected it and stopped it. we never got penetrated. but the point is that this is a very real threat. it's happening if we attempted to extract retribution this is something we need to talk about

you're right it would have been aprilly extremely difficult. it it the united did if we would have to attribute that directly to the chinese. what we're seeing right now the tremendous skepticism that is being ask by the american people and barack obama about weapons of mass destruction in syria. there's suspicious about is the evidence strong enough to warrant the limited strike on syria. i would argue you would find it to be even more difficult. more difficult for president obama to put forth before the people of this country a similar proposition he just put forward on chemical weapons which are frankly more visible. there's more ability to actually produce victims and symptoms and signatures you can --

this is why a modern doctrine for the threat is so needed. i think he has done a good service by putting forward and tom don lane who came here. we need a new version of mutual assured destruction for the cyber age. so they can operate more momly -- anonymously. focus on china as much as this conversation has. so let me first interject that cyber conflict, cyber mischief, cyber what have you is

borderless there are states and demonstrates. and whether the u.s. is hacking china or china hacking the u.s. or russia hacking both or israel hacking everyone. this is all taking place. we cannot look at the threats to networking security and data integrity and the context of one country in another country and those countries versus each oh. so what can be done is there such a thing as a perfectly secure networking? no. there never will be. we can make them more secured. and there are grossly speaking there are three different domains. there's what i do on the equipment side and the coding of the equipment side. and everything we build that any huawei or cicso or other is

built to global standards. our customers, operators, want to be able to have a competitive environment. they can -- i'll take a this from him and rationalize the market prices. they keep us honest. that means what we intild intend -- build is intended essentially interoperateble. when you drop the equipment to the networking, if you have not raised the security bar for in term for -- you accomplish nothing. how can we find and develop in a public-private partnership standards to raise the bar of the equipment that company like ours deliver? the second in the realm of service providers and data management. it's apparent over the last couple of months what we need in the space is more transparent regulation and environment

better geared to protecting the integrity of data. and the sthird the one that chad was speaking about. that's government. i would like to believe, i would like to believe that using l -- when two adversary came together in the '60s and recognized they could blow each other up umm teen decides an -- i'm almost done. who are we vulnerable to? so you nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the lowest common dmonl nateer. it didn't stop it but it slowed it. if they can agree on acceptable behavior, it won't stop espionage but may restrict disruption or potential disruption. that can be multilaterallize. >> i think it would be useful to

keep this a little more grounded. first that should be obvious i think is not. computer code can only effect computer code. in other words, as i'm sitting here on the podium. it applies to the rest of you. we are invulnerable to computer -- i do not have a pace make are with an ip address. [laughter] it's very important. could the united states attack that particular headquarter building in shanghai? the answer is it could certainly breach the information system. that is not probably not too difficult to do if it has an internet connection, et. cetera. you can weaponize and turn in to

something. in syria and others quite difficult. let think about that when we admire the trorngs on our new car. let's go to thed audience for the first question. here, sir. one moment. there's a mic coming your way. tell us who you are. and please ask a question. >> hello? yep, you're working. a fellow at georgetown. what are the options attribution or nonattribution. as a commercial entity what -- more importantly receiving remediation for the physical attack of a country or another what are your -- well, okay. the question is one about

escalation so there's an attack. you perceive an attack on the company in the united states. who attacks back? tell me if i'm right here. the company that is attacked? do they have a right to attack back? should a government attack back on their behalf? can we only play defense? tom? >> that's a big debate. whether hacking back is works. so i think there are two questions when we talk about hacking back. one is that it allows legal -- is it legal? the other is it deliver results? let ignore that for a moment. i had the conversation with a couple of companieslet not name them here. i have yet to see the -- the evidence it delivers

results? only example we have in the public domain is somebody hacking back is quite a funny one. it happened in georgia. three years ago where somebody apparently from russia hacked the georgia ministry and try to exfiltrate the document. and the computer emergency response team in georgia found out something was fishy and they actually put a pdf fire rigged had malware embedded and something fancy like nato agreement. so the russian hacker apparently stepped to the trap and hacked him and took a video of the guy and picture with his web cam. it's a guy sitting there and his wife in -- >> if anybody hasn't seen the photograph. go home tonight and dig it up. it's exactly what you think it

would be. [laughter] but it's an interesting point. it didn't solve the attribution problem. they didn't know who it was. they had no idea who of it. >> okay. chad, back in your days in dhs let's say company x got attacked. they call you up and say, i know my government. they are not going attack back on my behalf. because they don't want to escalate to a general cyber war. do you have any problem if we think we know who attacked us if we blow up their servers? >> well, it's a fair question and we -- when we got asked that. now that i'm out i'm being asked. the analogy i would use, if we think about a bank; right. if somebody walks in to a bank with a weapon, tries to take the money, and going out the door there's well established precedent that a private

security and armed private security forward legally can in fact order the individual to stop and if they refuse to cease and desist. they can, in fact, use lethal force. for whatever reason in the digital world we don't allow that. what you're seeing across the commercial environment from my clients is what dave describe is an unbelievable feeling of being left hanging out to dry by your own government. what is happening is as we sit here in the society we're starting to see historically the business community like the chamber of commerce. ..

>> not only is the active defense allow for a change of behavior, the reason why we think about it logically is because so many targets were people don't respond that we have someone that just does the low-level acts of defense, they move onto the next soft target. >> let me cut you off because we don't want to speak too long. this is uncharted territory. we need the legal framework

because in the absence of that, people are getting frustrated. >> so now we can all feel your pain. one of those themes where your company has been attacked, you think it's whether it's chinese government or chinese teenagers ordered chinese criminal groups or whatever. and i just installed the latest and greatest huawei servers. and i will be asking the question. is the attack from abroad? or perhaps unknown to us, i sort of help to the seat come into my system? >> i have thought the same that you have about the increasing attacks on the u.s. networks. and we have less than 1% of the u.s. network market.

the attacks are not taking place in this way. for what it is worth. >> okay. that is a good answer. >> the microphone is coming to your. >> thank you. >> we have been hearing for a long time now the danger of cyberattacks on national security, and we have been talking about the corporate grounds for the most part. where do you see this going? and is this realistic? when will it happen and what can we do about it? >> okay, you said academics don't look in the future. so look into the future. [laughter] >> the biggest problem is espionage and disrupting systems

and where is this going in the future? well, that is a great question. do let me go to the edwards noted revelation for a moment and that they part of the picture. the u.s. government, the nsa is beyond capable than they intercept more data and more information than many people previously assumed. i think one of the big questions of the future what does that mean? what does it mean for intelligence? what does it mean for the balance between western intelligence agencies in other countries. and i understand that we are

very concerned about what is going on at the moment and some of these revelations have a point to intercept. because we have an informed debate about what is going on and we should be able to do it. but right now what i am seeing is a difference and in fact, we are not having a conversation about what is okay to do and what is not okay to do. it's a very moral and ethical case to be made for an open democracy and after our we are an open democracy, which has to be part of this because many people think that that is not the case. and we are not part of the case to be made should be a part of

the democracy. we want this process because after all, this is a very important global concept and there is justification for this and we need to have that. >> and i know that i have a request to be less crowded, so i will be in just a moment. but we are also seeing as a result of this crisis, we read in the media the brazil is looking to launch a geo-satellite and the indian government is contemplating the elimination of gmail and yahoo for government employees in germany is looking to localize crowds and they have launched an

e-mail in germany that is safe from the nsa. we are seeing this fracturing of the internet environment which is not good for anyone and in the short term, there will be business opportunities. but in the long-term, the internet activities, we are reacting and vulcanize them. and that is not solving the problem and what that is is creating a challenge to steal and interoperability challenges and the spread of open information than what we need is to balance out that in all of the economic benefits associated with that with the need for real pragmatic approaches to better secure our networks. so it takes us is right to question that we have gotten by e-mail from an anonymous individual. not the group, but someone who doesn't want attribution to the question. and as by e-mail, do you think that there is a need for a

cyberweapons convention, much like the ncp, which is the nuclear nonproliferation treatment. and who should govern it and is there an interest. every time i asked someone, someone in the u.s. government, they flee in the other direction. but then again, for the fifth on transfers 15 years after the atomic bomb was developed, we didn't want to see an atomic bomb unit. so i don't want to get off topic. please tell us what works here in the analogy and what doesn't. is it even possible to have a treaty with a weapon that is not in the hands of the state, teenagers acting like terrorists, terrorists, whatever. and i believe this to chat. but what i said earlier is the

industry needs to do its best, which means that those of us that do this need to, all of us, be held to the same standards. and that means that we need to establish the best practices and disciplines that will then be certifiable to all of us, that service providers and data managers as well, the best disciplined environment as well is legal and regulatory regimes and the concepts of this entity for cyberis in the third realm and that is where government needs to work out their issues and those issues may be as simple as i won't crash your markets if you don't crash my planes. but they need to do that in the context of allowing industry to move forward commercially and competitively to continue to innovate. but the reasoning in the nuclear

realm is first the weapons were all in the hands of state and secondly, when one of them got walloped, it was this neat little screening that was down in some mountain in colorado that you would see in all the movies and he would see that you would have 30 minutes before you were annihilated. this screams for cyberweapons, you don't know whether or not an attack is coming, whether it's from this state or an individual or where it is coming from. so how do you make this work? >> it is exactly this challenge, which is the suspect is fundamentally decentralized and dynamics and 30 minutes is an

eternity. you have 30 minutes to respond in a long time, believe it or not. this is happening at the speed of light. thousands of attacks per second and what it means is that the old paradigm from the nuclear age of essentially having a command and control sector where there are two people in the united states to have the launch code, and the commander of norad that have the launch code, that have this syndication and a very exercise method of responding, that hierarchy is antithetical to this threat. this threat is decentralized. and we have a situation where thousands of attacks are happening per second and there's no way the president of the united states can sit there and say, it's like me coming up and saying, do we have this, what he wanted to do in this and that.

and what we have to do is actually look at the threats and realize that human talent is not dominated by the united states and the weapons are not dominated by any particular government and the command-and-control is not dominated and there's no thing that comes up with this clear ability to decentralized the dynamic response of government, decentralizing this in regards to the first few words. >> okay, so the nuclear analogy drive you up the wall. >> yes the attack code, if you want to call it that. without hundreds of thousands of attacks per day. and it is a specific targets scam.

there has only been one that we can take seriously in that way and i think no one would be able to do that. but almost all of these breaches this microphone or camera, they are not having any difference in this. so i think that's a very important qualification and it's not happening at the speed of light is out in the wild with these versions in 2007 and then what would become is discovered and this is the most sophisticated that we have. so we need to take some of this letter happening at the speed of light. >> and it took like a year and a half to figure it out. >> exactly. and that is an important point.

the surgical stride by a state-sponsored actor is a section of sophistication and i agree that they will happen less frequently. but within that, you start to look at the commercial espionage realm and that is the bulk of this. in that realm, what we need to think about is the governments are inherently not dynamic or decentralized and therefore, they are not the right answer. the right answer to the problem is let's get the standard items norms of behavior and empower the private sector who has decentralized the dynamics to deal with this, much like the

analogy where i grew up in texas, you have a local police force and the nypd and you don't always need a big government solution. and frankly, in this case, going back to the bank analogy, having a private solution, responding as long as they meet the certification in the standards, government doesn't have to solve all of our problems and we can in fact solve it ourselves, that high-end dedicated attack is the realm of state-sponsored government and you heard general alexander say and he got in trouble for that we don't even have our act together or the cybercommand that has just now announced that they will have this and that they won't be ready until 2016. that the calvary is not coming,

we are on our own and we have to have a global consensus and then in power with cyberpolice forces at the head of the problem. >> chat makes a great point. while organizing the office of cyberteams, somebody did strike this at the olympic games. they may not have been organized as a team, but they had to operate someplace. so the gentleman with his hand up there, a microphone is coming to you. >> hello, i am from policy in focus and there's an aspect that you have talked about, we have seen how vulnerable the world system is too chaotic behavior and so just how formidable are those systems because you mentioned the speed of light. it seems that most of our financial system now is being run by computer programs and

just how much chaos -- we have seen how much can be caused by a malfunctioning system. so, you know, could this be deliberate in the chaos theory? >> i think the question here is we have seen markets that know how to implode on themselves and we have seen nasdaq shutdown without any outside help and supposing someone came around and actually -- i think it raises an interesting question, but i think it raises another question for you, which is we couldn't have imagined a world that was this interdependent. but yet you can pick out a bunch of societies all at one time if necessary. and we really do that ourselves with lehman brothers and bear stearns five years ago.

tell us about the vulnerability of someone was trying to do a deliberately. >> there's no doubt. there have been a few instances over the past couple of months that some of you may remember. with a twitter account was hacked and as a result, they said that the president had been tried out in something like that and i have a market effect immediately. but only for a few minutes. >> people can make a lot of money in a few minutes in this town. >> that is right. but it bounced back very quickly. that's an interesting situation. there's a lot of people that got a call there in the washington dc area about this. in just a quick point. what does it mean?

if we look at science, it's an interesting pattern that we are getting used to. we are not really in denial itself, but we are just taking it down for a couple of hours. but you asked them in the major banks are worried. it is costing them millions of dollars per minute and with others, what we have seen is the shift from self-destruction and what is going on against wells fargo, bank of america, citibank, each of the attacks to steal money or intellectual property, these are direct attacks specifically for this, which is shaking the confidence of our system and you'd think about it on any given day, all of it, going to the bank,

tomorrow to take out money, no bank can withstand that. so it's a great question and that is politics by another means, an act of war. >> if there's no more questions, we will go to one more here. and i'm not a mother that we don't know if it's the same or a different anonymous, a question. if the only problem here is that your company has a chinese name, cisco has been known to help china build its firewalls. and have you thought about changing her name to something else? >> to the first part of the question, i think that the balance of the challenge that we have faced because we have a heritage in china, it is

stunning to me at times to explain to someone that it's a 35 billion-dollar company and trusted globally and up to $35 billion, one third of all the huawei gear comes from american suppliers, at like $7 billion worth of procurement last year and is stunning to many. but people cannot grasp that. so yes, a great deal of this is a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to be an international company with this heritage. if you read the senate report and so forth. it has links to the chinese military and where the founders of the company have talked. >> that's hogwash.

and you know, i thought that that might come up, and i thought about bringing in something about this tall, a 20 page report, with every bit of information, but i didn't want us to be distracted. and no, it is a fundamental part of the asia society and that is part of what we are here to do, to increase understanding of an area across different cultures and there's a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to be a multinational with a heritage in china. and let me ask you the reverse question. was there any similar concerns in time that you are aware of that they were buying into the system to which you were a part of? >> i mean, i cannot speak for the concerns on that side, but

you also have to keep in mind that the terminal, whether it is a pc or tablet or phone or what have you, it has not attracted the same attention as the access to the network in the corner. >> okay. >> and if you think about the name, say toyota, my grandmother used to buy japanese cars and imagine some of your parents today, i think we view toyota is a trusted brand with multiple individuals across the united states, and part of our closest allies are in japan. what is fascinating about that analogy is we did have to look at forcing the japanese to comply with rules and other things. >> yes, we even rented a toyota, and we got a lawyer to break

down the whole car, we assembled it and we didn't have to buy it but the point began to get into compliance and play by the global rules and now they are a trusted partner with it. >> certainly what the cia was doing with the federal trade commission with this. >> was part of the economic research with the cia. it was very sophisticated. >> will be interesting if you could see the cia parking lot. [laughter] okay, very good. [inaudible conversations] >> hello, i run a company specializing in negotiation and i would like to talk about the ip backside and recently we have engaged in a chinese entity regarding access of american technology and the american

company got no satisfaction in the chinese court system and the chinese company i.t. export the same technology where they did run into legal trouble than it was the fbi that was being sued but it's a multimillion dollar lawsuit against the chinese. does that offer any sort of optimism or glimmer of hope that there may be a market or a legal way of addressing cyberespionage >> who would like to take that? >> it is a subsidiary of this, which is essentially being bribed and the good old-fashioned way to deliver

information to chinese companies. so it's not a case of espionage, it is actually a very important human element. because of that. >> are you talking about american superconductors? >> that is a different case. that is a case that involves a wind turbine technology. so i think the fundamental point of your question as was said earlier, if we can work together to raise global standards and legal standards, the chinese have an equal interest in making sure that ultimately because they are going to have this intellectual property that needs to be protected and enforced, but that type of regime is critical in their groups like harvard and wharton that are

working hard to promote the chinese leadership and how critical this type of a legal more minutes. >> and when a company like this becomes a global leader, with one of the world's largest intellectual rights property holders, that helps you drive a broader and a more global respect for the protection of intellectual property rights. >> okay, we're down to our last two minutes. while the asia society does not endorse cyberwarfare, they said that if i do run over the time. , they would wipe my iphone clean before i leave the state. [laughter] 's we will end with a question from austria. to assess, isn't the use of cyberwarfare dislike using special operations and a tool of the trade?

let me expand on the question. there was a time in the 1950s when dwight eisenhower publicly said that nuclear weapons were another problem and over time we have decided, or he decided, quietly. but it really wasn't just a tool of the trade, but because it was so uncontrollable he would not use it. so what happens when we asked that same question in all that was laid out at the beginning for us? with espionage, with attacks on infrastructure with a political tool. can you imagine a situation where we all agree to take sides outside of our arsenal?

>> i'm not sure. we are engaged and i think that this is a better question for both the academic and others. >> you're caught in the crossfire in a very good point. we are visiting unfairly in the crossfire. >> we can't imagine someone deliberately using this kind of tool. so what would really be worse in dealing with this case? >> the israelis did on their way to redecorate the syrian reactor in 2007.

>> the outgoing secretary has made a suggestion to introduce this. a huge compilation and an outcry among the veterans. people that are just, you know, playing or tapping code, they should get a medal that is higher than the purple heart and chuck hagel is a veteran himself. so the point is that it is a means to talk about this, which they are doing and we have to respect the people who are experiencing mass. >> you get the last word because we are right up against the time. so it must be a brief last words so we have not unilaterally disarm the weapons to kind of begin